PEP 675 – Arbitrary Literal String Type
- Author:
- Pradeep Kumar Srinivasan <gohanpra at gmail.com>, Graham Bleaney <gbleaney at gmail.com>
- Sponsor:
- Jelle Zijlstra <jelle.zijlstra at gmail.com>
- Discussions-To:
- Typing-SIG thread
- Status:
- Final
- Type:
- Standards Track
- Topic:
- Typing
- Created:
- 30-Nov-2021
- Python-Version:
- 3.11
- Post-History:
- 07-Feb-2022
- Resolution:
- Python-Dev message
Table of Contents
Abstract
There is currently no way to specify, using type annotations, that a
function parameter can be of any literal string type. We have to
specify a precise literal string type, such as
Literal["foo"]
. This PEP introduces a supertype of literal string
types: LiteralString
. This allows a function to accept arbitrary
literal string types, such as Literal["foo"]
or
Literal["bar"]
.
Motivation
Powerful APIs that execute SQL or shell commands often recommend that they be invoked with literal strings, rather than arbitrary user controlled strings. There is no way to express this recommendation in the type system, however, meaning security vulnerabilities sometimes occur when developers fail to follow it. For example, a naive way to look up a user record from a database is to accept a user id and insert it into a predefined SQL query:
def query_user(conn: Connection, user_id: str) -> User:
query = f"SELECT * FROM data WHERE user_id = {user_id}"
conn.execute(query)
... # Transform data to a User object and return it
query_user(conn, "user123") # OK.
However, the user-controlled data user_id
is being mixed with the
SQL command string, which means a malicious user could run arbitrary
SQL commands:
# Delete the table.
query_user(conn, "user123; DROP TABLE data;")
# Fetch all users (since 1 = 1 is always true).
query_user(conn, "user123 OR 1 = 1")
To prevent such SQL injection attacks, SQL APIs offer parameterized queries, which separate the executed query from user-controlled data and make it impossible to run arbitrary queries. For example, with sqlite3, our original function would be written safely as a query with parameters:
def query_user(conn: Connection, user_id: str) -> User:
query = "SELECT * FROM data WHERE user_id = ?"
conn.execute(query, (user_id,))
...
The problem is that there is no way to enforce this
discipline. sqlite3’s own documentation can only admonish
the reader to not dynamically build the sql
argument from external
input; the API’s authors cannot express that through the type
system. Users can (and often do) still use a convenient f-string as
before and leave their code vulnerable to SQL injection.
Existing tools, such as the popular security linter Bandit, attempt to detect unsafe external data used in SQL APIs, by inspecting the AST or by other semantic pattern-matching. These tools, however, preclude common idioms like storing a large multi-line query in a variable before executing it, adding literal string modifiers to the query based on some conditions, or transforming the query string using a function. (We survey existing tools in the Rejected Alternatives section.) For example, many tools will detect a false positive issue in this benign snippet:
def query_data(conn: Connection, user_id: str, limit: bool) -> None:
query = """
SELECT
user.name,
user.age
FROM data
WHERE user_id = ?
"""
if limit:
query += " LIMIT 1"
conn.execute(query, (user_id,))
We want to forbid harmful execution of user-controlled data while still allowing benign idioms like the above and not requiring extra user work.
To meet this goal, we introduce the LiteralString
type, which only
accepts string values that are known to be made of literals. This is a
generalization of the Literal["foo"]
type from PEP 586.
A string of type
LiteralString
cannot contain user-controlled data. Thus, any API
that only accepts LiteralString
will be immune to injection
vulnerabilities (with pragmatic limitations).
Since we want the sqlite3
execute
method to disallow strings
built with user input, we would make its typeshed stub
accept a sql
query that is of type LiteralString
:
from typing import LiteralString
def execute(self, sql: LiteralString, parameters: Iterable[str] = ...) -> Cursor: ...
This successfully forbids our unsafe SQL example. The variable
query
below is inferred to have type str
, since it is created
from a format string using user_id
, and cannot be passed to
execute
:
def query_user(conn: Connection, user_id: str) -> User:
query = f"SELECT * FROM data WHERE user_id = {user_id}"
conn.execute(query) # Error: Expected LiteralString, got str.
...
The method remains flexible enough to allow our more complicated example:
def query_data(conn: Connection, user_id: str, limit: bool) -> None:
# This is a literal string.
query = """
SELECT
user.name,
user.age
FROM data
WHERE user_id = ?
"""
if limit:
# Still has type LiteralString because we added a literal string.
query += " LIMIT 1"
conn.execute(query, (user_id,)) # OK
Notice that the user did not have to change their SQL code at all. The type checker was able to infer the literal string type and complain only in case of violations.
LiteralString
is also useful in other cases where we want strict
command-data separation, such as when building shell commands or when
rendering a string into an HTML response without escaping (see
Appendix A: Other Uses). Overall, this combination of strictness
and flexibility makes it easy to enforce safer API usage in sensitive
code without burdening users.
Usage statistics
In a sample of open-source projects using sqlite3
, we found that
conn.execute
was called ~67% of the time
with a safe string literal and ~33% of the time
with a potentially unsafe, local string variable. Using this PEP’s
literal string type along with a type checker would prevent the unsafe
portion of that 33% of cases (ie. the ones where user controlled data
is incorporated into the query), while seamlessly allowing the safe
ones to remain.
Rationale
Firstly, why use types to prevent security vulnerabilities?
Warning users in documentation is insufficient - most users either never see these warnings or ignore them. Using an existing dynamic or static analysis approach is too restrictive - these prevent natural idioms, as we saw in the Motivation section (and will discuss more extensively in the Rejected Alternatives section). The typing-based approach in this PEP strikes a user-friendly balance between strictness and flexibility.
Runtime approaches do not work because, at runtime, the query string
is a plain str
. While we could prevent some exploits using
heuristics, such as regex-filtering for obviously malicious payloads,
there will always be a way to work around them (perfectly
distinguishing good and bad queries reduces to the halting problem).
Static approaches, such as checking the AST to see if the query string is a literal string expression, cannot tell when a string is assigned to an intermediate variable or when it is transformed by a benign function. This makes them overly restrictive.
The type checker, surprisingly, does better than both because it has
access to information not available in the runtime or static analysis
approaches. Specifically, the type checker can tell us whether an
expression has a literal string type, say Literal["foo"]
. The type
checker already propagates types across variable assignments or
function calls.
In the current type system itself, if the SQL or shell command execution function only accepted three possible input strings, our job would be done. We would just say:
def execute(query: Literal["foo", "bar", "baz"]) -> None: ...
But, of course, execute
can accept any possible query. How do we
ensure that the query does not contain an arbitrary, user-controlled
string?
We want to specify that the value must be of some type
Literal[<...>]
where <...>
is some string. This is what
LiteralString
represents. LiteralString
is the “supertype” of
all literal string types. In effect, this PEP just introduces a type
in the type hierarchy between Literal["foo"]
and str
. Any
particular literal string, such as Literal["foo"]
or
Literal["bar"]
, is compatible with LiteralString
, but not the
other way around. The “supertype” of LiteralString
itself is
str
. So, LiteralString
is compatible with str
, but not the
other way around.
Note that a Union
of literal types is naturally compatible with
LiteralString
because each element of the Union
is individually
compatible with LiteralString
. So, Literal["foo", "bar"]
is
compatible with LiteralString
.
However, recall that we don’t just want to represent exact literal
queries. We also want to support composition of two literal strings,
such as query + " LIMIT 1"
. This too is possible with the above
concept. If x
and y
are two values of type LiteralString
,
then x + y
will also be of type compatible with
LiteralString
. We can reason about this by looking at specific
instances such as Literal["foo"]
and Literal["bar"]
; the value
of the added string x + y
can only be "foobar"
, which has type
Literal["foobar"]
and is thus compatible with
LiteralString
. The same reasoning applies when x
and y
are
unions of literal types; the result of pairwise adding any two literal
types from x
and y
respectively is a literal type, which means
that the overall result is a Union
of literal types and is thus
compatible with LiteralString
.
In this way, we are able to leverage Python’s concept of a Literal
string type to specify that our API can only accept strings that are
known to be constructed from literals. More specific details follow in
the remaining sections.
Specification
Runtime Behavior
We propose adding LiteralString
to typing.py
, with an
implementation similar to typing.NoReturn
.
Note that LiteralString
is a special form used solely for type
checking. There is no expression for which type(<expr>)
will
produce LiteralString
at runtime. So, we do not specify in the
implementation that it is a subclass of str
.
Valid Locations for LiteralString
LiteralString
can be used where any other type can be used:
variable_annotation: LiteralString
def my_function(literal_string: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
class Foo:
my_attribute: LiteralString
type_argument: List[LiteralString]
T = TypeVar("T", bound=LiteralString)
It cannot be nested within unions of Literal
types:
bad_union: Literal["hello", LiteralString] # Not OK
bad_nesting: Literal[LiteralString] # Not OK
Type Inference
Inferring LiteralString
Any literal string type is compatible with LiteralString
. For
example, x: LiteralString = "foo"
is valid because "foo"
is
inferred to be of type Literal["foo"]
.
As per the Rationale, we also infer LiteralString
in the
following cases:
- Addition:
x + y
is of typeLiteralString
if bothx
andy
are compatible withLiteralString
. - Joining:
sep.join(xs)
is of typeLiteralString
ifsep
’s type is compatible withLiteralString
andxs
’s type is compatible withIterable[LiteralString]
. - In-place addition: If
s
has typeLiteralString
andx
has type compatible withLiteralString
, thens += x
preservess
’s type asLiteralString
. - String formatting: An f-string has type
LiteralString
if and only if its constituent expressions are literal strings.s.format(...)
has typeLiteralString
if and only ifs
and the arguments have types compatible withLiteralString
. - Literal-preserving methods: In Appendix C,
we have provided an exhaustive list of
str
methods that preserve theLiteralString
type.
In all other cases, if one or more of the composed values has a
non-literal type str
, the composition of types will have type
str
. For example, if s
has type str
, then "hello" + s
has type str
. This matches the pre-existing behavior of type
checkers.
LiteralString
is compatible with the type str
. It inherits all
methods from str
. So, if we have a variable s
of type
LiteralString
, it is safe to write s.startswith("hello")
.
Some type checkers refine the type of a string when doing an equality check:
def foo(s: str) -> None:
if s == "bar":
reveal_type(s) # => Literal["bar"]
Such a refined type in the if-block is also compatible with
LiteralString
because its type is Literal["bar"]
.
Examples
See the examples below to help clarify the above rules:
literal_string: LiteralString
s: str = literal_string # OK
literal_string: LiteralString = s # Error: Expected LiteralString, got str.
literal_string: LiteralString = "hello" # OK
Addition of literal strings:
def expect_literal_string(s: LiteralString) -> None: ...
expect_literal_string("foo" + "bar") # OK
expect_literal_string(literal_string + "bar") # OK
literal_string2: LiteralString
expect_literal_string(literal_string + literal_string2) # OK
plain_string: str
expect_literal_string(literal_string + plain_string) # Not OK.
Join using literal strings:
expect_literal_string(",".join(["foo", "bar"])) # OK
expect_literal_string(literal_string.join(["foo", "bar"])) # OK
expect_literal_string(literal_string.join([literal_string, literal_string2])) # OK
xs: List[LiteralString]
expect_literal_string(literal_string.join(xs)) # OK
expect_literal_string(plain_string.join([literal_string, literal_string2]))
# Not OK because the separator has type 'str'.
In-place addition using literal strings:
literal_string += "foo" # OK
literal_string += literal_string2 # OK
literal_string += plain_string # Not OK
Format strings using literal strings:
literal_name: LiteralString
expect_literal_string(f"hello {literal_name}")
# OK because it is composed from literal strings.
expect_literal_string("hello {}".format(literal_name)) # OK
expect_literal_string(f"hello") # OK
username: str
expect_literal_string(f"hello {username}")
# NOT OK. The format-string is constructed from 'username',
# which has type 'str'.
expect_literal_string("hello {}".format(username)) # Not OK
Other literal types, such as literal integers, are not compatible with LiteralString
:
some_int: int
expect_literal_string(some_int) # Error: Expected LiteralString, got int.
literal_one: Literal[1] = 1
expect_literal_string(literal_one) # Error: Expected LiteralString, got Literal[1].
We can call functions on literal strings:
def add_limit(query: LiteralString) -> LiteralString:
return query + " LIMIT = 1"
def my_query(query: LiteralString, user_id: str) -> None:
sql_connection().execute(add_limit(query), (user_id,)) # OK
Conditional statements and expressions work as expected:
def return_literal_string() -> LiteralString:
return "foo" if condition1() else "bar" # OK
def return_literal_str2(literal_string: LiteralString) -> LiteralString:
return "foo" if condition1() else literal_string # OK
def return_literal_str3() -> LiteralString:
if condition1():
result: Literal["foo"] = "foo"
else:
result: LiteralString = "bar"
return result # OK
Interaction with TypeVars and Generics
TypeVars can be bound to LiteralString
:
from typing import Literal, LiteralString, TypeVar
TLiteral = TypeVar("TLiteral", bound=LiteralString)
def literal_identity(s: TLiteral) -> TLiteral:
return s
hello: Literal["hello"] = "hello"
y = literal_identity(hello)
reveal_type(y) # => Literal["hello"]
s: LiteralString
y2 = literal_identity(s)
reveal_type(y2) # => LiteralString
s_error: str
literal_identity(s_error)
# Error: Expected TLiteral (bound to LiteralString), got str.
LiteralString
can be used as a type argument for generic classes:
class Container(Generic[T]):
def __init__(self, value: T) -> None:
self.value = value
literal_string: LiteralString = "hello"
x: Container[LiteralString] = Container(literal_string) # OK
s: str
x_error: Container[LiteralString] = Container(s) # Not OK
Standard containers like List
work as expected:
xs: List[LiteralString] = ["foo", "bar", "baz"]
Interactions with Overloads
Literal strings and overloads do not need to interact in a special
way: the existing rules work fine. LiteralString
can be used as a
fallback overload where a specific Literal["foo"]
type does not
match:
@overload
def foo(x: Literal["foo"]) -> int: ...
@overload
def foo(x: LiteralString) -> bool: ...
@overload
def foo(x: str) -> str: ...
x1: int = foo("foo") # First overload.
x2: bool = foo("bar") # Second overload.
s: str
x3: str = foo(s) # Third overload.
Backwards Compatibility
We propose adding typing_extensions.LiteralString
for use in
earlier Python versions.
As PEP 586 mentions, type checkers “should feel free to experiment with more sophisticated inference techniques”. So, if the type checker infers a literal string type for an unannotated variable that is initialized with a literal string, the following example should be OK:
x = "hello"
expect_literal_string(x)
# OK, because x is inferred to have type 'Literal["hello"]'.
This enables precise type checking of idiomatic SQL query code without annotating the code at all (as seen in the Motivation section example).
However, like PEP 586, this PEP does not mandate the above inference
strategy. In case the type checker doesn’t infer x
to have type
Literal["hello"]
, users can aid the type checker by explicitly
annotating it as x: LiteralString
:
x: LiteralString = "hello"
expect_literal_string(x)
Rejected Alternatives
Why not use tool X?
Tools to catch issues such as SQL injection seem to come in three flavors: AST based, function level analysis, and taint flow analysis.
AST-based tools: Bandit
has a plugin to warn when SQL queries are not literal
strings. The problem is that many perfectly safe SQL
queries are dynamically built out of string literals, as shown in the
Motivation section. At the
AST level, the resultant SQL query is not going to appear as a string
literal anymore and is thus indistinguishable from a potentially
malicious string. To use these tools would require significantly
restricting developers’ ability to build SQL queries. LiteralString
can provide similar safety guarantees with fewer restrictions.
Semgrep and pyanalyze: Semgrep supports a more sophisticated
function level analysis, including constant propagation
within a function. This allows us to prevent injection attacks while
permitting some forms of safe dynamic SQL queries within a
function. pyanalyze
has a similar extension. But neither handles function calls that
construct and return safe SQL queries. For example, in the code sample
below, build_insert_query
is a helper function to create a query
that inserts multiple values into the corresponding columns. Semgrep
and pyanalyze forbid this natural usage whereas LiteralString
handles it with no burden on the programmer:
def build_insert_query(
table: LiteralString
insert_columns: Iterable[LiteralString],
) -> LiteralString:
sql = "INSERT INTO " + table
column_clause = ", ".join(insert_columns)
value_clause = ", ".join(["?"] * len(insert_columns))
sql += f" ({column_clause}) VALUES ({value_clause})"
return sql
def insert_data(
conn: Connection,
kvs_to_insert: Dict[LiteralString, str]
) -> None:
query = build_insert_query("data", kvs_to_insert.keys())
conn.execute(query, kvs_to_insert.values())
# Example usage
data_to_insert = {
"column_1": value_1, # Note: values are not literals
"column_2": value_2,
"column_3": value_3,
}
insert_data(conn, data_to_insert)
Taint flow analysis: Tools such as Pysa or CodeQL are capable of tracking data flowing
from a user controlled input into a SQL query. These tools are
powerful but involve considerable overhead in setting up the tool in
CI, defining “taint” sinks and sources, and teaching developers how to
use them. They also usually take longer to run than a type checker
(minutes instead of seconds), which means feedback is not
immediate. Finally, they move the burden of preventing vulnerabilities
on to library users instead of allowing the libraries themselves to
specify precisely how their APIs must be called (as is possible with
LiteralString
).
One final reason to prefer using a new type over a dedicated tool is that type checkers are more widely used than dedicated security tooling; for example, MyPy was downloaded over 7 million times in Jan 2022 vs less than 2 million times for Bandit. Having security protections built right into type checkers will mean that more developers benefit from them.
Why not use a NewType
for str
?
Any API for which LiteralString
would be suitable could instead be
updated to accept a different type created within the Python type
system, such as NewType("SafeSQL", str)
:
SafeSQL = NewType("SafeSQL", str)
def execute(self, sql: SafeSQL, parameters: Iterable[str] = ...) -> Cursor: ...
execute(SafeSQL("SELECT * FROM data WHERE user_id = ?"), user_id) # OK
user_query: str
execute(user_query) # Error: Expected SafeSQL, got str.
Having to create a new type to call an API might give some developers pause and encourage more caution, but it doesn’t guarantee that developers won’t just turn a user controlled string into the new type, and pass it into the modified API anyway:
query = f"SELECT * FROM data WHERE user_id = f{user_id}"
execute(SafeSQL(query)) # No error!
We are back to square one with the problem of preventing arbitrary
inputs to SafeSQL
. This is not a theoretical concern
either. Django uses the above approach with SafeString
and
mark_safe. Issues
such as CVE-2020-13596
show how this technique can fail.
Also note that this requires invasive changes to the source code
(wrapping the query with SafeSQL
) whereas LiteralString
requires no such changes. Users can remain oblivious to it as long as
they pass in literal strings to sensitive APIs.
Why not try to emulate Trusted Types?
Trusted Types is a W3C specification for preventing DOM-based Cross Site Scripting (XSS). XSS occurs when dangerous browser APIs accept raw user-controlled strings. The specification modifies these APIs to accept only the “Trusted Types” returned by designated sanitizing functions. These sanitizing functions must take in a potentially malicious string and validate it or render it benign somehow, for example by verifying that it is a valid URL or HTML-encoding it.
It can be tempting to assume porting the concept of Trusted Types to Python could solve the problem. The fundamental difference, however, is that the output of a Trusted Types sanitizer is usually intended to not be executable code. Thus it’s easy to HTML encode the input, strip out dangerous tags, or otherwise render it inert. With a SQL query or shell command, the end result still needs to be executable code. There is no way to write a sanitizer that can reliably figure out which parts of an input string are benign and which ones are potentially malicious.
Runtime Checkable LiteralString
The LiteralString
concept could be extended beyond static type
checking to be a runtime checkable property of str
objects. This
would provide some benefits, such as allowing frameworks to raise
errors on dynamic strings. Such runtime errors would be a more robust
defense mechanism than type errors, which can potentially be
suppressed, ignored, or never even seen if the author does not use a
type checker.
This extension to the LiteralString
concept would dramatically
increase the scope of the proposal by requiring changes to one of the
most fundamental types in Python. While runtime taint checking on
strings, similar to Perl’s taint,
has been considered and
attempted in the past, and
others may consider it in the future, such extensions are out of scope
for this PEP.
Rejected Names
We considered a variety of names for the literal string type and solicited ideas on typing-sig. Some notable alternatives were:
Literal[str]
: This is a natural extension of theLiteral["foo"]
type name, but typing-sig objected that users could mistake this for the literal type of thestr
class.LiteralStr
: This is shorter thanLiteralString
but looks weird to the PEP authors.LiteralDerivedString
: This (along withMadeFromLiteralString
) best captures the technical meaning of the type. It represents not just the type of literal expressions, such as"foo"
, but also that of expressions composed from literals, such as"foo" + "bar"
. However, both names seem wordy.StringLiteral
: Users might confuse this with the existing concept of “string literals” where the string exists as a syntactic token in the source code, whereas our concept is more general.SafeString
: While this comes close to our intended meaning, it may mislead users into thinking that the string has been sanitized in some way, perhaps by escaping HTML tags or shell-related special characters.ConstantStr
: This does not capture the idea of composing literal strings.StaticStr
: This suggests that the string is statically computable, i.e., computable without running the program, which is not true. The literal string may vary based on runtime flags, as seen in the Motivation examples.LiteralOnly[str]
: This has the advantage of being extensible to other literal types, such asbytes
orint
. However, we did not find the extensibility worth the loss of readability.
Overall, there was no clear winner on typing-sig over a long period,
so we decided to tip the scales in favor of LiteralString
.
LiteralBytes
We could generalize literal byte types, such as Literal[b"foo"]
,
to LiteralBytes
. However, literal byte types are used much less
frequently than literal string types and we did not find much user
demand for LiteralBytes
, so we decided not to include it in this
PEP. Others may, however, consider it in future PEPs.
Reference Implementation
This is implemented in Pyre v0.9.8 and is actively being used.
The implementation simply extends the type checker with
LiteralString
as a supertype of literal string types.
To support composition via addition, join, etc., it was sufficient to
overload the stubs for str
in Pyre’s copy of typeshed.
Appendix A: Other Uses
To simplify the discussion and require minimal security knowledge, we
focused on SQL injections throughout the PEP. LiteralString
,
however, can also be used to prevent many other kinds of injection
vulnerabilities.
Command Injection
APIs such as subprocess.run
accept a string which can be run as a
shell command:
subprocess.run(f"echo 'Hello {name}'", shell=True)
If user-controlled data is included in the command string, the code is
vulnerable to “command injection”; i.e., an attacker can run malicious
commands. For example, a value of ' && rm -rf / #
would result in
the following destructive command being run:
echo 'Hello ' && rm -rf / #'
This vulnerability could be prevented by updating run
to only
accept LiteralString
when used in shell=True
mode. Here is one
simplified stub:
def run(command: LiteralString, *args: str, shell: bool=...): ...
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
Most popular Python web frameworks, such as Django, use a templating engine to produce HTML from user data. These templating languages auto-escape user data before inserting it into the HTML template and thus prevent cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
But a common way to bypass auto-escaping
and render HTML as-is is to use functions like mark_safe
in
Django
or do_mark_safe
in Jinja2,
which cause XSS vulnerabilities:
dangerous_string = django.utils.safestring.mark_safe(f"<script>{user_input}</script>")
return(dangerous_string)
This vulnerability could be prevented by updating mark_safe
to
only accept LiteralString
:
def mark_safe(s: LiteralString) -> str: ...
Server Side Template Injection (SSTI)
Templating frameworks, such as Jinja, allow Python expressions which will be evaluated and substituted into the rendered result:
template_str = "There are {{ len(values) }} values: {{ values }}"
template = jinja2.Template(template_str)
template.render(values=[1, 2])
# Result: "There are 2 values: [1, 2]"
If an attacker controls all or part of the template string, they can insert expressions which execute arbitrary code and compromise the application:
malicious_str = "{{''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[408]('rm - rf /',shell=True)}}"
template = jinja2.Template(malicious_str)
template.render()
# Result: The shell command 'rm - rf /' is run
Template injection exploits like this could be prevented by updating
the Template
API to only accept LiteralString
:
class Template:
def __init__(self, source: LiteralString): ...
Logging Format String Injection
Logging frameworks often allow their input strings to contain
formatting directives. At its worst, allowing users to control the
logged string has led to CVE-2021-44228 (colloquially
known as log4shell
), which has been described as the “most
critical vulnerability of the last decade”.
While no Python frameworks are currently known to be vulnerable to a
similar attack, the built-in logging framework does provide formatting
options which are vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks from
externally controlled logging strings. The following example
illustrates a simple denial of service scenario:
external_string = "%(foo)999999999s"
...
# Tries to add > 1GB of whitespace to the logged string:
logger.info(f'Received: {external_string}', some_dict)
This kind of attack could be prevented by requiring that the format
string passed to the logger be a LiteralString
and that all
externally controlled data be passed separately as arguments (as
proposed in Issue 46200):
def info(msg: LiteralString, *args: object) -> None:
...
Appendix B: Limitations
There are a number of ways LiteralString
could still fail to
prevent users from passing strings built from non-literal data to an
API:
1. If the developer does not use a type checker or does not add type annotations, then violations will go uncaught.
2. cast(LiteralString, non_literal_string)
could be used to lie to
the type checker and allow a dynamic string value to masquerade as a
LiteralString
. The same goes for a variable that has type Any
.
3. Comments such as # type: ignore
could be used to ignore
warnings about non-literal strings.
4. Trivial functions could be constructed to convert a str
to a
LiteralString
:
def make_literal(s: str) -> LiteralString:
letters: Dict[str, LiteralString] = {
"A": "A",
"B": "B",
...
}
output: List[LiteralString] = [letters[c] for c in s]
return "".join(output)
We could mitigate the above using linting, code review, etc., but
ultimately a clever, malicious developer attempting to circumvent the
protections offered by LiteralString
will always succeed. The
important thing to remember is that LiteralString
is not intended
to protect against malicious developers; it is meant to protect
against benign developers accidentally using sensitive APIs in a
dangerous way (without getting in their way otherwise).
Without LiteralString
, the best enforcement tool API authors have
is documentation, which is easily ignored and often not seen. With
LiteralString
, API misuse requires conscious thought and artifacts
in the code that reviewers and future developers can notice.
Appendix C: str
methods that preserve LiteralString
The str
class has several methods that would benefit from
LiteralString
. For example, users might expect
"hello".capitalize()
to have the type LiteralString
similar to
the other examples we have seen in the Inferring LiteralString section. Inferring the type
LiteralString
is correct because the string is not an arbitrary
user-supplied string - we know that it has the type
Literal["HELLO"]
, which is compatible with LiteralString
. In
other words, the capitalize
method preserves the LiteralString
type. There are several other str
methods that preserve
LiteralString
.
We propose updating the stub for str
in typeshed so that the
methods are overloaded with the LiteralString
-preserving
versions. This means type checkers do not have to hardcode
LiteralString
behavior for each method. It also lets us easily
support new methods in the future by updating the typeshed stub.
For example, to preserve literal types for the capitalize
method,
we would change the stub as below:
# before
def capitalize(self) -> str: ...
# after
@overload
def capitalize(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def capitalize(self) -> str: ...
The downside of changing the str
stub is that the stub becomes
more complicated and can make error messages harder to
understand. Type checkers may need to special-case str
to make
error messages understandable for users.
Below is an exhaustive list of str
methods which, when called with
arguments of type LiteralString
, must be treated as returning a
LiteralString
. If this PEP is accepted, we will update these
method signatures in typeshed:
@overload
def capitalize(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def capitalize(self) -> str: ...
@overload
def casefold(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def casefold(self) -> str: ...
@overload
def center(self: LiteralString, __width: SupportsIndex, __fillchar: LiteralString = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def center(self, __width: SupportsIndex, __fillchar: str = ...) -> str: ...
if sys.version_info >= (3, 8):
@overload
def expandtabs(self: LiteralString, tabsize: SupportsIndex = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def expandtabs(self, tabsize: SupportsIndex = ...) -> str: ...
else:
@overload
def expandtabs(self: LiteralString, tabsize: int = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def expandtabs(self, tabsize: int = ...) -> str: ...
@overload
def format(self: LiteralString, *args: LiteralString, **kwargs: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def format(self, *args: str, **kwargs: str) -> str: ...
@overload
def join(self: LiteralString, __iterable: Iterable[LiteralString]) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def join(self, __iterable: Iterable[str]) -> str: ...
@overload
def ljust(self: LiteralString, __width: SupportsIndex, __fillchar: LiteralString = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def ljust(self, __width: SupportsIndex, __fillchar: str = ...) -> str: ...
@overload
def lower(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def lower(self) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def lstrip(self: LiteralString, __chars: LiteralString | None = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def lstrip(self, __chars: str | None = ...) -> str: ...
@overload
def partition(self: LiteralString, __sep: LiteralString) -> tuple[LiteralString, LiteralString, LiteralString]: ...
@overload
def partition(self, __sep: str) -> tuple[str, str, str]: ...
@overload
def replace(self: LiteralString, __old: LiteralString, __new: LiteralString, __count: SupportsIndex = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def replace(self, __old: str, __new: str, __count: SupportsIndex = ...) -> str: ...
if sys.version_info >= (3, 9):
@overload
def removeprefix(self: LiteralString, __prefix: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def removeprefix(self, __prefix: str) -> str: ...
@overload
def removesuffix(self: LiteralString, __suffix: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def removesuffix(self, __suffix: str) -> str: ...
@overload
def rjust(self: LiteralString, __width: SupportsIndex, __fillchar: LiteralString = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def rjust(self, __width: SupportsIndex, __fillchar: str = ...) -> str: ...
@overload
def rpartition(self: LiteralString, __sep: LiteralString) -> tuple[LiteralString, LiteralString, LiteralString]: ...
@overload
def rpartition(self, __sep: str) -> tuple[str, str, str]: ...
@overload
def rsplit(self: LiteralString, sep: LiteralString | None = ..., maxsplit: SupportsIndex = ...) -> list[LiteralString]: ...
@overload
def rsplit(self, sep: str | None = ..., maxsplit: SupportsIndex = ...) -> list[str]: ...
@overload
def rstrip(self: LiteralString, __chars: LiteralString | None = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def rstrip(self, __chars: str | None = ...) -> str: ...
@overload
def split(self: LiteralString, sep: LiteralString | None = ..., maxsplit: SupportsIndex = ...) -> list[LiteralString]: ...
@overload
def split(self, sep: str | None = ..., maxsplit: SupportsIndex = ...) -> list[str]: ...
@overload
def splitlines(self: LiteralString, keepends: bool = ...) -> list[LiteralString]: ...
@overload
def splitlines(self, keepends: bool = ...) -> list[str]: ...
@overload
def strip(self: LiteralString, __chars: LiteralString | None = ...) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def strip(self, __chars: str | None = ...) -> str: ...
@overload
def swapcase(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def swapcase(self) -> str: ...
@overload
def title(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def title(self) -> str: ...
@overload
def upper(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def upper(self) -> str: ...
@overload
def zfill(self: LiteralString, __width: SupportsIndex) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def zfill(self, __width: SupportsIndex) -> str: ...
@overload
def __add__(self: LiteralString, __s: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def __add__(self, __s: str) -> str: ...
@overload
def __iter__(self: LiteralString) -> Iterator[str]: ...
@overload
def __iter__(self) -> Iterator[str]: ...
@overload
def __mod__(self: LiteralString, __x: Union[LiteralString, Tuple[LiteralString, ...]]) -> str: ...
@overload
def __mod__(self, __x: Union[str, Tuple[str, ...]]) -> str: ...
@overload
def __mul__(self: LiteralString, __n: SupportsIndex) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def __mul__(self, __n: SupportsIndex) -> str: ...
@overload
def __repr__(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def __repr__(self) -> str: ...
@overload
def __rmul__(self: LiteralString, n: SupportsIndex) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def __rmul__(self, n: SupportsIndex) -> str: ...
@overload
def __str__(self: LiteralString) -> LiteralString: ...
@overload
def __str__(self) -> str: ...
Appendix D: Guidelines for using LiteralString
in Stubs
Libraries that do not contain type annotations within their source may
specify type stubs in Typeshed. Libraries written in other languages,
such as those for machine learning, may also provide Python type
stubs. This means the type checker cannot verify that the type
annotations match the source code and must trust the type stub. Thus,
authors of type stubs need to be careful when using LiteralString
,
since a function may falsely appear to be safe when it is not.
We recommend the following guidelines for using LiteralString
in stubs:
- If the stub is for a pure function, we recommend using
LiteralString
in the return type of the function or of its overloads only if all the corresponding parameters have literal types (i.e.,LiteralString
orLiteral["a", "b"]
).# OK @overload def my_transform(x: LiteralString, y: Literal["a", "b"]) -> LiteralString: ... @overload def my_transform(x: str, y: str) -> str: ... # Not OK @overload def my_transform(x: LiteralString, y: str) -> LiteralString: ... @overload def my_transform(x: str, y: str) -> str: ...
- If the stub is for a
staticmethod
, we recommend the same guideline as above. - If the stub is for any other kind of method, we recommend against
using
LiteralString
in the return type of the method or any of its overloads. This is because, even if all the explicit parameters have typeLiteralString
, the object itself may be created using user data and thus the return type may be user-controlled. - If the stub is for a class attribute or global variable, we also
recommend against using
LiteralString
because the untyped code may write arbitrary values to the attribute.
However, we leave the final call to the library author. They may use
LiteralString
if they feel confident that the string returned by
the method or function or the string stored in the attribute is
guaranteed to have a literal type - i.e., the string is created by
applying only literal-preserving str
operations to a string
literal.
Note that these guidelines do not apply to inline type annotations
since the type checker can verify that, say, a method returning
LiteralString
does in fact return an expression of that type.
Resources
Literal String Types in Scala
Scala uses
Singleton
as the supertype for singleton types, which includes
literal string types, such as "foo"
. Singleton
is Scala’s
generalized analogue of this PEP’s LiteralString
.
Tamer Abdulradi showed how Scala’s literal string types can be used for “Preventing SQL injection at compile time”, Scala Days talk Literal types: What are they good for? (slides 52 to 68).
Thanks
Thanks to the following people for their feedback on the PEP:
Edward Qiu, Jia Chen, Shannon Zhu, Gregory P. Smith, Никита Соболев, CAM Gerlach, Arie Bovenberg, David Foster, and Shengye Wan
Copyright
This document is placed in the public domain or under the CC0-1.0-Universal license, whichever is more permissive.
Source: https://github.com/python/peps/blob/main/peps/pep-0675.rst
Last modified: 2024-06-11 22:12:09 GMT